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This paper explores the impact of the 2007 EU enlargement on the consumption behavior of 
immigrant households. Using data from a unique Italian survey and a diff-in-diff approach, 
we find that the enlargement induced a consumption increase for immigrants from new 
member states. This effect concerned both undocumented and documented immigrants, 
albeit through different channels. Detailed information on immigrants’ legal status and 
sector of employment allows us to shed light on the exact mechanisms. Following the 
enlargement, previously undocumented immigrants experienced increases in labor income 
by moving away from the informal sector, whereas immigrants who were already working 
legally in Italy benefitted from an increased probability of getting permanent contracts. 
Enhanced employment stability in turn reduced uncertainty, leading to an increase in 
documented immigrants’ consumption. 
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1 Introduction1
Despite the large literature on the economic analysis of immigration, little is known
about immigrant householdsconsumption behaviour in the host economy. In principle, a
high level of uncertainty can depress the economic activity of households, including their
consumption. When economic decisions are costly to revert, high uncertainty may induce
individuals to postpone their decisions until uncertainty is su¢ ciently resolved and more
information is available (Bernanke, 1983). Immigrants tend to face higher economic un-
certainty than natives, which may a¤ect their consumption behavior.2 On the one hand,
undocumented immigrants are constantly at risk of being apprehended and subsequently
deported, and when employed, they work in the informal economy and earn lower salaries
(DellAringa and Neri, 1987). Legalization procedures di¤er by country but are costly and
burdensome in general.3 On the other hand, documented immigrants are allowed to stay in
the host country for a prespecied period of time and are obliged to leave when their permit
expires. Permits can be renewable but this is usually subject to fullling certain conditions
such as earning high-enough income and/or not entailing in any criminal activity.
One of the fundamental principles of the European Union (EU) enables immigrants
from the member states to live and work in the EU without the need of a work permit, and
grants them the right to equal treatment with natives in employment, wages, and working
conditions.4 Thus, the EU accession plausibly implies an improvement in the employment
opportunities of citizens from new member states, while reducing the degree of uncertainty
and the precautionary savings motive. This could translate into higher income, and thus
1We are indebted to Gian Carlo Blangiardo for kindly providing us with the data. Many thanks
to Árpád Ábrahám, Gaetano Basso, Andrea Brandolini, Matteo Bugamelli, Francesca Carta, Tanika
Chakraborty, Federico Cingano, Marta De Philippis, Ruben Durante, Giovanni Facchini, Francesco Fasani,
Jesús Fernández-Huertas, Federico Giorgi, Colin Green, Marcel Jansen, Melanie Jones, Zoë Kuehn, Francesco
Manaresi, Giovani Mastrobuoni, Sauro Mocetti, Elisabetta Olivieri, Massimo Sbracia, Paolo Sestito, Steven
Stillman, Jan Stuhler, Marco Tonello, Eliana Viviano, Han Ye and the participants in the Bank of Italy
lunch seminar, in the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid lunch seminar, in the JRC-EC Ispra seminar, in the
Universitat de Girona lunch seminar, in the BGSE PhD Jamboree in Barcelona, in the International Confer-
ence on Migration and Welfare in Rome, in the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid A&E reading group, in the
CARBS Microeconomics Research Group Workshop, in the WISERD conference in Bangor, in the ESPE
conference in Glasgow, in the WPEG in She¢ eld, in the 2nd Applied Microeconomics Workshop in Bolzano,
in the Migration and the Labour Market Workshop in Edinburgh, in the 17th IZA/SOLE Transatlantic
Meeting of Labor Economists in Ammersee, in the AIEL-INPS International Workshop on Immigration
in Rome, in the EEA conference in Cologne, in the EALE conference in Lyon, in the 2nd CRCTR 224
Workshop for Young Researchers in Montabaur, in the FRIAS Junior Researcher Conference in Freiburg,
in the 2019 ZEW Public Finance Conference, and in the Migration and Mobility workshop in Glasgow for
useful discussions and help. Financial support by the German Research Foundation through CRC TR 224
(Project A03) is gratefully acknowledged.
2Dustmann (1997) develops a model of return migration and shows that in fact immigrants may engage
in more precautionary savings due to higher income uncertainty.
3For instance, in the case of Italy, they involve nding a sponsoring employer and their success probability
is subject to yearly quotas.
4Article 45 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex 39 and 48).
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into an increase in consumption, in particular among the undocumented immigrants, who
could now move into the formal sector. In the case of documented immigrants, the reduced
labor market uncertainty coupled with a higher probability of getting a permanent contract
may also boost household consumption expenditure.5 As a result, extending citizenship
rights might have an important impact on domestic demand. Despite its relevance, the
link between citizenship and consumption has been largely overlooked empirically. Using
data from a unique survey in Italy and employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, we
study whether and through which channels the extension of EU citizenship a¤ected the
consumption behavior of immigrant households following the 2007 enlargement. In our
research design, we restrict our sample to immigrants who arrived in Italy before 2007
and compare the monthly consumption of households from new member states (Romania
and Bulgaria) and candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey), before and after the enlargement.6 ;7 We test
the validity of our identication strategy by addressing anticipation and composition e¤ects
as well as spillover e¤ects by using immigrants from A8 countries as an alternative control
group and by exploiting heterogeneity across regions and occupations.8 Italy provides an
ideal context to study the e¤ects of the 2007 enlargement as it has long been one of the main
destinations for both Romanians and Bulgarians, even before 2007. Moreover, although the
EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria was an expected event, its labor market consequences
in Italy were not, and the EU accession implied for Romanians and Bulgarians full rights
to work (see Section 3 for a detailed discussion).
Our unique dataset allows us to focus both on documented immigrants, for whom cit-
izenship mainly implies that they do not need to renew their permits any more, and on
undocumented immigrants, who benetted from legalization. Furthermore, detailed infor-
mation on labor market outcomes, including the sector of employment (informal/formal),
allows us to shed light on the exact mechanisms. We nd that the EU accession signicantly
increased average monthly consumption of immigrant households in the year of accession,
5See Campos and Reggio (2015) for the relationship between labor market uncertainty and consumption
and Barceló and Villanueva (2016) for the e¤ect of permanent contracts on household consumption and
wealth accumulation.
6A similar identication strategy has been adopted by recent papers that study the labor market e¤ects
of the 2004 enlargement (see Elsner, 2013a and 2013b; Ruhs, 2017; and Ruhs and Wadsworth, 2018).
7Although Iceland is among the candidate countries, their nationals can work in Italy as well as in other
EU countries on the same footing as EU nationals, since they belong to the European Economic Area.
Therefore, we do not consider Icelanders as part of our control group.
8A8 countries are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia,
which joined the EU in 2004.
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but also a few years later, in line with the presence of liquidity constraints. The increase
in consumption involved both undocumented and documented immigrants albeit through
di¤erent channels. Specically, the former increased their expenditure on food, clothes,
and other basic-need items due to increased labor income. We provide evidence that this
was mainly achieved by moving from the informal towards the formal sector. Documented
immigrants instead, increased mostly the consumption of durable goods. In their case, the
underlying mechanism is a gradual increase in employment stability through permanent job
contracts, which reduces the uncertainty about future labor income and thus, increases the
propensity to consume.9 At the same time, the probability of holding savings and remitting
goes down, consistent with a reduced precautionary savings motive.10 While legalization
policies are usually di¢ cult to implement due to the high political cost entailed, our results
imply that simplifying instead the bureaucratic procedure of work permits for documented
immigrants may lead to similar consumption increases. The labor market channel that our
analysis highlights is in line with Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015), who exploit the same
natural experiment and nd that immigrant crime decreases due to increased employment
opportunities.
The literature on the consumption behavior of both documented and undocumented
immigrants is scarce mainly due to data limitations. Two recent exceptions, exploiting
the same dataset that we use, are Dustmann et al. (2017) and Barigozzi and Speciale
(2011). Dustmann et al. (2017) use amnesty quotas to analyze the e¤ect of immigrants
legal status on their consumption behavior in Italy and nd that undocumented immigrants
consume about 40% less than documented immigrants and that this is partly due to their
lower income. In our analysis we highlight an additional channel, that is the increased
probability of getting a permanent contract for immigrants that were documented even
before their home country accessed the EU. In the new legal framework, work permits of
citizens from new member countries were no longer of limited duration, which plausibly
made rms more willing to o¤er them permanent contracts. Enhanced labor stability in
turn decreases the uncertainty about future labor income, and thus increases the propensity
to consume. Barigozzi and Speciale (2011) also focus on Italy and study the di¤erences in
9We complement our ndings with additional evidence from Social Security records that point to the
same direction.
10According to the literature, one of the reason why immigrants remit is to insure themselves against risk.
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) show that remittances act as a form of family-provided insurance and
self insurance. Delpierre and Verheyden (2014) develop a model with endogenous remittances, savings, and
return decisions under uncertainty and show that when migrants face relatively low wage risks in the host
country, they tend to remit less.
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the consumption behavior of natives, documented and undocumented immigrants. They
nd that the permanence in the host country plays an important role in attenuating these
di¤erences. In our empirical exercise we control for years of residence and we show that the
immigrants that benetted most from the EU enlargement were those with less than 5 years
of residence in Italy, who were not eligible for permanent residence permits. Moreover, in a
placebo exercise we nd no e¤ect among immigrants who held or were eligible to apply for
the Italian citizenship.
Our ndings also contribute to a very recent literature that studies the labor market
e¤ects of faster access to citizenship as well as of di¤erent asylum policies. This strand of
the literature suggests that faster access to citizenship improves the labor market attach-
ment of female immigrants and their investment in host country-specic skills (Gathmann
and Keller, 2018). Similarly, higher recognition and decision rates boost the employment
prospects and the economic integration of refugees (Fasani et al., 2018), while a lengthy
period before obtaining the right to work seem to hamper them (Ballatore et al., 2017). We
also explore alternative explanations, such as easier access to credit, but the labor market
channel remains the most plausible underlying mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief description of the
Italian labor market in the context of immigration and of the legal framework regarding
immigrants. Section 3 describes the natural experiment we exploit in our analysis. Section
4 presents the data, sample and identication strategy and Section 5 outlines the empirical
approach and presents the main results. Section 6 explores possible underlying mechanisms
while Section 7 performs a series of robustness checks and discusses alternative channels.
Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
Immigration is considered to be a structural characteristic of the Italian society and
labor market (Quassoli, 1999). The empirical evidence shows that the demand for immigrant
workers in Italian labor market is mainly concentrated on unskilled jobs (Fullin and Reyneri,
2011) and compared to employed Italians, immigrant workers are more likely to be employed
in sectors with low-pay, high job instability, and weak employment protection (Ambrosini
and Barone, 2007). Immigrant workers are also more exposed than natives to temporary
employment contracts (Barone, 2009), which are consistently found to be associated with
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lower job satisfaction and greater di¢ culty in balancing work and family, and provide less
opportunities for work-related training and career advancement opportunities compared to
permanent contracts (see, for example, Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Blanchard and Landier,
2002; Bonet et al., 2013; Booth et al., 2002; Dolado et al., 2002).11
In relation to the legal framework for immigration, Italy o¤ers various types of residence
permits, including those granted for work reasons, which can be either temporary and need to
be renewed in certain intervals (permesso di soggiorno) or permanent (carta di soggiorno).12
Residence permits for work reasons are subject to quotas set by the government each year
for di¤erent categories of immigrant workers (see, for a discussion, Pinotti, 2017).13 The
type of employment contract has a direct e¤ect on the frequency that residence permits
need to be renewed. The temporary residence permit for work reasons has a validity of two
years for immigrants working under an open-ended (permanent) contract and a validity of
one year for those with xed-term (temporary) contracts. Immigrants become eligible for a
permanent permit of unlimited duration after ve years of legal residence in Italy and the
successful completion of an Italian language test.
Despite its comprehensive legal framework, as of January 2018, there were an estimated
533,000 undocumented immigrants in Italy (ISMU, 2018). Undocumented immigrants ei-
ther enter the country without a permit or they enter on short-term visas (e.g. tourist
or student visa) and then overstay despite having their documents expired (Fasani, 2015;
Fullin and Reyneri, 2011). They tend to choose countries where it is easy for them to work
for a period, even without a work permit, which they might obtain subsequently through
regularization programmes or by nding an employer in the formal sector to sponsor them
(Levinson, 2005). Although the immigrantslegal status (documented/undocumented) and
sector of employment (formal/informal) are not necessarily reciprocal, the relatively large
informal economy in Italy has been a major factor in promoting undocumented immigration
11 In the late 1980s, Italy was considered to have one of the strictest labor markets in terms of employment
protection legislation (OECD, 2004). To provide more exibility to employers, Italy relaxed the rules for
the use of temporary contracts in 1987, which, prior to this year, could only be used for seasonal work,
specic projects or for replacement of absent workers temporarily (Kugler and Pica, 2008). Since then,
temporary contracts steadily increased as a share of total employment (Cappellari et al., 2012). In the
period of our analysis (2001-2012) around 13% of the workforce was under temporary employment contracts
(Istat, Labour Force Survey). While the extended use of temporary contracts allowed for more exibility
in the labor market, large di¤erences in terms of employment protection legislation between permanent and
temporary contracts have been a concern (Garibaldi and Taddei, 2013).
12Other types include those granted for family reasons (e.g. spouse or dependent child of a legal resident)
and special permits for study purposes and permits for asylum seekers/humanitarian reasons.
13 Immigrants can be sponsored for two main types of permits: type-A permits for domestic and care
workers employed by families and type-B permits for workers employed by rms. The latter are further
distinguished between B1 and B2 permits for construction and non-construction workers.
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(Reyneri, 1998).14 The ndings of recent studies suggest that once undocumented immi-
grants are regularized, the majority move to the formal sector (Fullin and Reyneri, 2011)
and stay in it (Di Porto et al., 2018). Overall, the evidence consistently shows that, all else
equal, undocumented immigrants have worse labor market outcomes than documented im-
migrants (see, for example, Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007; Borjas and Tienda, 1993; Fasani,
2015; Guriev et al., 2019; Kaushal; 2006; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002).
3 The Natural Experiment
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on January 1, 2007.15 In fact, the EU accession of
Romania and Bulgaria was an expected event as the accession negotiations were successfully
concluded in 2004. However, the accession treaties allowed member states to impose tempo-
ral labor market restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian workers for up to seven years after
accession. All EU states were required to open their labor markets to the citizens of the
two newest members by the end of 2013, but they had to give justication if they wished to
restrict access beyond 2011.16 The majority of member states, including Italy, announced
that would impose interim restrictions to protect their labor markets from a large ow of
immigrants from the new member states and therefore Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants
would still be required to have a permit in order to work.17
However, just three days prior to the EU accession, on December 28, 2006, the newly-
elected, center-left government in Italy lifted the restrictions for high skilled employment
as well as in sectors where the vast majority of Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants used
to work, such as construction, hotel and tourism, domestic work, care services, agriculture,
engineering and seasonal work. In these sectors, employers of Bulgarian and Romanian
14A unique feature of our data is that we can observe both undocumented/documented immigrants working
in the informal/formal sector. In our sample, all undocumented immigrants but also 14% of the documented
immigrants work in the informal sector.
15Following the EU enlargement in 2007, Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in Italy were instantly
granted with the EU citizenship and became documented without the need of obtaining/renewing any
residence permit.
16Some member states, that had imposed interim labour market restrictions in 2007, lifted them in advance
of this deadline. Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Hungary opened their labor markets to arrivals
from Bulgaria and Romania before the end of the transitory period, while the UK, Germany, Austria, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Malta and Luxembourg maintained restrictions for the maximum period.
17Note that work permits were not transferable across member states. Therefore, Romanian and Bulgar-
ians citizens, who were legally working in one of the member states at the date of accession and had a work
permit for 12 months or longer, would have direct access to the labor market of that member state but not
automatically to the labor markets of other member states. If they voluntarily left the labour market of
the host member state, they would lose the right of access to the labor market of that state. These interim
restrictions only applied to access to the labour market by workers and not to the free provision of services
nor to the freedom of establishment, students, tourists, pensioners, etc.
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workers simply needed to submit a copy of the employment contract to the local labor
o¢ ce. Migration quotas were maintained only in the manufacturing sector but were eased
so as to accommodate a larger number of workers from the new member states.18 As a
result, in 2007, Italy was the only major economy in Europe to lift restrictions on workers
from Romania and Bulgaria, granting them in practise full rights to work in Italy.19 Not
surprisingly, the number of Romanian and Bulgarian residents in Italy has almost doubled
between 2006 and 2007.20
The other countries that opened immediately their labor markets to the citizens of the
new member states were Finland and Sweden, as well as the majority of member states that
joined the EU in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia. Nevertheless, among all, Italy was the only country that had long
been the main destination for both Romanians and Bulgarians, even before the EU enlarge-
ment in 2007 (European Commission, 2008). Spain, the other most preferred destination
for Romanians and Bulgarians, maintained restrictions until January 2009 and reintroduced
them again, for workers from Romania in July 2011 until the end of 2013. Figure A1 in the
Appendix summarizes the timing of the events.
4 Data and Identication
4.1 The ISMU data
Our main data source is an annual survey launched in 2001 by a non-governmental
organization, the Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-Ethnicity (ISMU) to study
the foreign population residing in the Lombardy region of Italy. Each survey consists of
a random sample of about 8,000 immigrants (repeated cross section), who are aged 15
and over and reside in Italy at the time of the interview. A unique feature of the ISMU
survey is that its sampling scheme was specically designed to collect information on a
representative sample of both documented and undocumented immigrants (see Data Section
in the Appendix). In order to obtain truthful answers from the respondents on legal status
and informal employment, no sensitive information is asked (e.g. name and address) and
the data are collected in public spaces by interviewers with a foreign background, who have
18 Italy fully liberalised its labor market for citizens of Romania and Bulgaria as of 1 January 2012.
19See Migration Advisory Committee Report (2008) and House of Commons Home A¤airs Committee
Report (2007). See also Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) for a similar discussion.
20See Italian National Institute of Statistics at http://demo.istat.it/archivio.html.
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undergone specic training, and emphasize the independence of ISMU from the government
at the beginning of the interview (see Dustmann et al., 2017; Guriev et al., 2019).
The ISMU data include rich information on personal characteristics such as age, gender,
education, marital status, country of origin, years of residence in Italy, residence permit as
well as employment status and labor income.21 Information on the residence permits allows
us to identify the legal status of the respondents. In particular, we consider immigrants as
documented if they reported to have a valid residence permit (permanent or temporary) at
the time of the interview. Employed respondents were also asked about their labor income,
type of employment contract and occupation, and importantly for our analysis, whether
they work in the formal or in the informal sector.
As the statistical unit of analysis in the ISMU surveys is the individual, information on
the family is limited and therefore we do not observe household income, employment and
labor income of the spouse. Nevertheless, there is available information on the number of
household members living with the respondent, the number of children (living with the re-
spondent in Italy and abroad), marital status, and (for the married respondents) on whether
the spouse is living with the respondent or abroad, as well as on whether the respondent
is living in own property. More importantly, from 2004 to 2012, respondents were asked
questions about their household consumption expenditure. In particular, the respondents
had to report in euros their average households monthly expenditure in Italy within the
year of the interview on three broad categories of consumption: (i) food, clothes, and basic
needs; (ii) housing such as rent, mortgage, maintenance, bills; and (iii) other items such as
transportation, leisure, installment purchases and debt.22 Our main dependent variable is
the total consumption of immigrant households in the host country, i.e. the sum of these
three types of consumption expenditure, but we also explore each of the disaggregated con-
sumption categories separately. In our benchmark estimates, we use the average monthly
household consumption controlling for the number of household members and cohabiting
children as well as the total number of children (cohabiting or not) and whether the spouse
lives with the respondent or abroad. We also check the sensitivity of our main results using
equivalized consumption (see Section 7). Respondents were also asked to report in euros
21The country of origin refers to the individual respondent rather than the whole household. We check the
sensitivity of our results to the denition of immigrant households by restricting the sample to immigrants
who are living with a partner from the same country of origin or singles/not living with a partner (see
Section 7).
22Throughout the paper, we use the term durables to refer to the latter as it is likely to include large
and long-term purchases such as cars or home appliances that are usually bought in installments.
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their average monthly remittances as well as their monthly savings in Italy. Information
on monthly remittances is likely to be subject to measurement error while there is no in-
formation on savings held in the home country (see Dustmann et al., 2017 for a further
discussion). Moreover, many respondents report zero monthly remittances and/or savings.
Therefore, in Section 6 we adopt a linear probability model as well as a model that takes
censoring at zero into account to study the e¤ect both on the extensive and the intensive
margin of savings and remittances. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with
caution due to the measurement of these variables in the ISMU survey.
Two factors should be mentioned before going ahead. First, the ISMU survey concerns
only the Lombardy region of Italy. However, Lombardy can be considered as a good ap-
proximation of the whole country as it is the most populated and one of the largest and
wealthiest regions of Italy, and has the largest migrant population in the country account-
ing for 25% of the total (IReR, 2010).23 Second, due to the cross-sectional nature of the
survey, we are not able to trace the same individuals over time. Still, we are able to recover
some retrospective information on whether respondents in our sample were documented and
working in the formal sector before the EU enlargement. In particular, given that there was
no need of obtaining/renewing the work permit in 2007 among the treated, we can infer
that those with a valid work permit in 2007 had obtained it beforehand. Moreover, we use
the Social Security records, that allow us to follow individuals over time, obtaining some
additional evidence regarding the labor market outcomes (wages and type of contract).
4.2 Sample and identication
In our analysis we use all nine waves (2004-2012) of the ISMU data that include infor-
mation on average monthly household expenditure to explore the impact of the EU enlarge-
ment on the consumption of immigrant households from new member states. Our treatment
group consists of Romanians and Bulgarians. A natural control group for new EU member
countries is the EU candidate member countries as they should be comparable on the basis
of the political and economic conditions (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2015). Moreover, their
attitudes towards risk should be similar to those of Romanians and Bulgarians given their
common migration choices.24 Therefore, immigrants from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey constitute our control
23See Appendix Figure A2 for a map of Lombardy in Italy/Europe and its 11 (12 since 2009) provinces.
24There is a growing body of empirical literature supporting the existence of a relationship between the
migration decision and attitudes towards risk. See, for example, Bonin et al. (2009) and Jaeger et al. (2010).
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group.25
Since Italy experienced an expansion of migration from Romania and Bulgaria following
their accession to the EU, the causal e¤ect of the EU enlargement on the consumption of
immigrant households would be contaminated by the di¤erent selection of new immigrants
following the EU accession. To address this issue, we restrict our sample to immigrants
who arrived in Italy before 2007, i.e., before Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU.26 We
also restrict our sample to immigrants who do not hold Italian citizenship by the time of
the interview and with no more than ten years of residence in Italy by the time of the EU
accession since a non-EU citizen, having legally resided in Italy for ten years, is eligible to
apply for the Italian citizenship.27
In Figure 1, we present the average monthly consumption of immigrant households in
the host country for the treatment and the control groups, before and after the enlargement
for each year. As shown in panel A, Romanians and Bulgarians living in Italy had lower
average monthly consumption than immigrants from EU candidate countries. The di¤er-
ence remained fairly constant until 2007, suggesting that the consumption expenditure of
treatment and control groups were following parallel trends prior to the EU enlargement.
In 2007, with the EU accession, the average monthly consumption of the treated group in-
creased substantially, while the one of the control group continued to grow at approximately
the same rate as in the previous years (panel A). This increase in total consumption was
mainly driven by the increase in the expenditure on food, clothing and other basic needs
and on transportation, leisure, installment purchases and debt (panels B and D) and is
evident not only immediately after the EU accession but also in the following years. By
contrast, the immigrant householdshousing expenditure continued to grow in the year of
EU accession at approximately the same rate as in the previous years, both for the treated
and the control group (panel C).
Table 1 presents the means of all the variables included in our analysis for the treated and
control groups in our sample prior to (2004-2006) and after (2007-2012) the EU enlargement
(see Appendix Table A2 for a description of these variables). Focusing on the individual and
25As a robustness check, we repeated the analysis using an alternative control group that consists of the
nationals of Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, which
joined the EU in 2004 (see Section 7).
26As a further robustness check, we repeated the analysis by restricting our sample to Romanian and
Bulgarian migrants who moved to Italy at least one year, then two years and nally three years before the
EU enlargement (see Section 7). Note that the latter corresponds to immigrants who arrived in Italy before
the end of the accession negotiations of Romania and Bulgaria in 2004.
27We use this excluded group to perform a placebo exercise in Section 7.
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household characteristics, the treatment and control groups are similar to each other before
the EU enlargement in terms of age composition. However, there are notable di¤erences in
other characteristics. Immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania are more likely to be female
and to be more educated than immigrants from EU candidate countries. They are less
likely to have a valid residence permit (being documented) and they reside in Italy for a
smaller average number of years. Moreover, they tend to live in smaller households with
fewer children. In terms of employment outcomes, Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants
have lower labor income than immigrants from EU candidate countries and are more likely
to work under temporary contracts and in the informal sector.
Focusing on the before and after trends, the treated group experiences higher consump-
tion and labor income increases than the control group after the enlargement. The share
of females and the average years of residence evolve in a similar way among the two groups
while the composition by education remains pretty stable over time. There is an increase in
the fraction of immigrants with at least one child and a decrease in the fraction of those with
spouses living abroad, especially in the treated group. These di¤erences could a¤ect our
analysis, as other things being equal, they would lead to an increase in the number of house-
hold members that would translate mechanically into an increase in household consumption
expenditure. Therefore, in our analysis we always control for the changing household struc-
ture and perform a series of robustness checks on this issue.
In the next section, we account for compositional di¤erences between the treated and
control groups and test the validity of the parallel trends assumption using a regression
framework, which reinforces the causal interpretation of the e¤ect of EU accession on the
monthly consumption expenditure of immigrants from new EU member countries. In what
follows, we also examine whether any trends in the observable characteristics of immigrants
are the same across the treatment and control groups. In particular, we test the validity of
our approach by analyzing whether the composition of Romanians and Bulgarians changed
in some systematic way following the EU enlargement.
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5 Regression Analysis
5.1 Short-term analysis
Since the observed di¤erences in consumption presented in Figure 1 may reect the
underlying di¤erences between the treatment and the control groups rather than a treatment
e¤ect, it is important to control for individual and household characteristics. For this
purpose, we rst focus on the short-term impact of the EU accession (i.e. from year 2006
to 2007) and set our empirical model as follows:
ln(cicpt) = + postt + new EUc  postt +
individual controlsz }| {
Xicpt
+ Zicpt'| {z }
household controls
+ c|{z}
country of origin fe
+ p|{z}
province fe
+ icpt; (1)
where i is an index for the households, c is the country of origin, p is the Italian province of
residence and t is the year of the interview. The dependent variable ln cicpt is the natural
logarithm of immigrant household is average monthly consumption expenditure (total; food,
clothing and other basic needs; housing such as rent, mortgage, maintenance, bills; or other
items such as transportation, leisure, installment purchases and debt) in the host country.
The variable new EUc is an indicator for individuals in the treated group and postt is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the year of enlargement (2007) and 0 in the
year before (2006). The coe¢ cient of the interaction between the new EUc and postt is
the short-term e¤ect of the EU enlargement on the consumption of immigrant households
from the new member countries in the host country. The term new EUc is not shown as its
coe¢ cient is absorbed by the country of origin xed e¤ects, c. The individual controlsXicpt
include an indicator for whether the respondent is a female; the respondents age and its
square; indicators for the respondents education categories (none, primary, secondary and
tertiary or above); and the respondents years of residence in Italy. The household controls
included in the vector Zicpt are the number of household members; the total number of
children living in Italy and abroad; the number of children and non-adult children living
with the respondent in Italy; an indicator for the spouse living abroad; an indicator for
home ownership in Italy. In our full specication, we also include the respondents average
monthly labor income in addition to individual and household controls as a proxy for the
household income. Finally, province of residence in Italy is denoted as p and icpt is an error
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term. As immigrants of the same nationality are likely to reside in the same province, the
consumption expenditure may be correlated within country of origin groups but also within
provinces. We thus cluster standard errors by Italian province of residence and country of
origin using the two-way method proposed by Cameron et al. (2011).28
In equation 1, the coe¢ cient  is the shared e¤ect of the EU enlargement. The main
coe¢ cient of interest is  which is the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient, comparing monthly
consumption of immigrant households from new member states and EU candidate countries
in the host country, before and after the EU enlargement. Table 2 presents the short-
term estimates in separate panels for total consumption and for the broad categories of
consumption expenditure. In each panel, we include country of origin and Italian residence
of province xed e¤ects, and gradually add individual and household controls. In the last
column of each panel, we also control for the respondents average monthly labor income
net of taxes.29
As shown in panel A of Table 2, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is positive, and
statistically signicant, suggesting that Romanian and Bulgarian households living in Italy
increased their total consumption with the EU accession. The estimated e¤ects are fairly
similar across specications which can be taken as a rst indication that our ndings are not
driven by the changes in the composition of immigrants after the EU enlargement. Using
the full specication (panel A column 4), we nd an increase in total consumption of around
8.9% which is consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints. The remaining panels
of Table 2 focus on broad categories of the consumption expenditure, i.e. basic need items
(food and clothing), housing, and durables (transportation, leisure, installment purchases
and debt) that account on average for around 40%, 40% and 20% of total consumption,
respectively. According to our estimates, the positive e¤ect is signicant for expenditure on
basic need items (panel B) and on durables (panel D), but there is no immediate signicant
e¤ect on housing expenditure (panel C). Our estimates imply that with the EU accession,
Romanian and Bulgarian households residing in Italy increased their expenditure on food,
consumption, and other basic needs of around 7.7%, which is similar in magnitude to the
28This results in 88 clusters in the short-term analysis. Nevertheless, we also check sensitivity of our results
clustering standard errors solely at the country of origin level (11 clusters) using the wild bootstrap method
(Cameron et al., 2008) with 1000 replications to account for the small number of clusters (see Section 7).
29One drawback is that household income information is not available for survey years earlier than 2007.
Therefore, we use the respondents labor income as a proxy of the household income (the correlation coef-
cient between household income and respondents labor income in our sample is around 0.27 for the years
2007-2012). Dropping the respondents labor income from our preferred specication, leaves our main results
unchanged.
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e¤ect on total consumption, and their expenditure on less basic needs and durable goods
around 14%.
5.2 Pre-trends and persistence
In order to test the validity of our analysis, we now adopt a more generalized framework
like in Autor (2003) that allows us to test for parallel trends but also to examine the
persistence of the e¤ect. For this purpose, we use data for the period 2004-2012 and we
augment equation (1) with lags and leads of the treatment as given by equation (2)
ln(cicpt) =
leads & lags of the treatment
+
z }| {
5X
j= 3
jDicpt(t = 2007 + j) new EUc
+ Xicpt| {z }
individual
controls
+ Zicpt'| {z }
household
controls
+ c|{z}
country of
origin fe
+ p|{z}
province
fe
+ t|{z}
year
fe
+ "icpt; (2)
including year xed e¤ects (t) in our specication to capture the common time trends in the
monthly consumption expenditure of the treatment and the control groups, and the changes
in macroeconomic variables (e.g. ination). The term new EUc is not shown because the
coe¢ cient is absorbed by the country of origin xed e¤ects (c).
In equation (2) Dicpt(:) is an indicator variable for each year of the interview t. For
j = 0, the estimate of the parameter j is the immediate e¤ect of the enlargement in
2007, which is comparable to the coe¢ cient estimate  in equation (1). Moreover, if the
estimates of j for j =  3;  2; and  1 are not statistically signicant we can conclude
that the trends between the treated and the control group in the period before the EU
enlargement (2004-2006) were parallel, which is crucial for the validity of our di¤erence-in-
di¤erences estimation. Furthermore, the j for j > 0 are informative about the persistence
of the e¤ect, i.e., whether the increase in consumption after the enlargement is permanent
or temporary.
Table 3 and Figure 2 show the results that we obtain from this generalized method, with
2004 being the reference year. First, the coe¢ cients for 2005 and 2006 are not statistically
di¤erent from zero conrming the validity of the parallel trends assumption. Furthermore,
the estimates for 2007 are in line with those obtained by (1) as we nd a positive and
signicant e¤ect on total consumption, as well as on expenditure on food, clothing and
other basic needs (panel B) and on transportation, leisure, installment purchases and debt
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(panel D), but no signicant e¤ect on housing expenditure (panel C) in the short-run, with
the estimated coe¢ cients for the interaction between new EUc and year 2007 being similar
in magnitude to those presented in Table 2 (new EUc  post). Moreover, the coe¢ cients
of total consumption expenditure and of its subcategories are statistically signicant and
positive in various years after 2007, suggesting that the results of the EU enlargement do
not vanish. Moreover, in the medium run it emerges a positive e¤ect on housing expenditure
as well. In the next section, we explore whether improved employment conditions lie behind
these e¤ects providing a possible explanation for their pattern and discussing the role of the
precautionary savings motive.
6 Mechanisms
One of the most important benet for the immigrants of the new EU member countries
is the right to work in all EU countries without the need of a work permit. As discussed
in Section 3, Italy had initially announced that it would impose interim restrictions to
protect its labor market just like other EU countries did. However, just a few days before
the accession Romanians and Bulgarians acquired full rights to work in Italy. This could
have direct e¤ects on the employment probability and the labor income of our treated
group which may explain the increase in the immigrant household consumption that we
documented in the previous section. In fact, after the EU enlargement the labor income
and the percentage of those with permanent contracts increased among immigrants in the
treated group (by 6% and 8 percentage points, respectively) while they remained fairly
constant among immigrants in the control group (see Table 1). Moreover, before the EU
enlargement 20% of immigrants in our treated group were undocumented and 31% were
working informally. After the EU enlargement, they all became documented (as they gained
EU citizenship) and the percentage of informality decreased sharply -yet did not disappear-
to 18%. At the same time the percentage of undocumented and of those working informally
decreased only slightly among immigrants in the control group.
Table 4 presents the results of regressions for di¤erent labor market aspects.30 We ob-
serve a positive labor force participation e¤ect after the accession (column 1) and a positive,
though not statistically signicant, employment e¤ect (column 2). Indeed, most immigrants
30The ISMU data contain information on labor market outcomes in all available waves (2001-2012). We
estimate linear probability models for the probability of working informally and the probability of holding
a permanent contract .
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who were legal residents before the accession were already employed since obtaining a work
permit is the most common way of becoming documented in Italy (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti,
2015).31 Moreover, even undocumented immigrants tend to work but in the shadow econ-
omy.32 Note that the ISMU data contain information both for the formal and the informal
employment, and thus it is not puzzling that the probability of employment did not increase
signicantly. What did increase after the EU enlargement is the labor income (column 3).
The increase in the labor income is in line with Ruhs (2017), who nds that labor earn-
ings of Eastern European immigrants in the UK have increased after the accession of their
home countries in the EU. Our data allow us to further explore whether the increase in
the labor income that we observe in our setting has occurred by immigrants moving out
of the shadow economy. Indeed, as shown in column 4, we nd a strong decrease in the
probability of working in the informal sector in the period 2007-2011, consistent with this
argument. We then repeat the analysis on labor income, but only for those employed in the
formal sector, and the positive e¤ects essentially disappear (column 5). Among those, we
nd instead a signicant increase in the probability of having a permanent contract in the
years 2008 and 2009 (column 6).
An alternative explanation for our results might be that the immigrant households
consumption response is due to the change in the residence legal status associated with
the EU accession. In fact, Dustmann et al. (2017) analyze the e¤ect of immigrantslegal
status on their consumption behavior and nd that undocumented immigrants consume
about 40% less than documented immigrants. As a result of gaining EU citizenship, all
Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in Italy were documented after 2007. Although the
ISMU data provide information on current legal status, there is no information on former
legal status (before the EU enlargement). Due to their cross-sectional nature, it is also not
possible to distinguish between those immigrants from the newly accessed countries that
were legalized by the EU enlargement, and those that were legally residing in Italy already
before. Likewise, there is no retrospective information on informal/formal work. Still, we
are able to single out a particular set of immigrants, for whom we can infer that they were
both residing legally and working in the formal sector before the accession of their home
country in the EU. We do so by focusing on a subsample of documented immigrants who
reported in 2007 to have a valid residence permit for (dependent) work. The rationale
31 In our sample, 65% of all documented immigrants have a residence permit for work reasons.
32 In our sample, 74% of all undocumented immigrants work and all do so in the informal sector.
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behind our strategy is that the respondents in our treatment group should have obtained
the permit (i.e. legally residing and working in the formal sector in Italy as an employee)
before the EU enlargement, since there was no need for them to obtain or renew it in
2007 after the EU accession.33 ;34 This strategy has the advantage of identifying the set
of immigrants, for whom the EU enlargement basically implied that they did not need to
renew their permits any more as opposed to undocumented immigrants or those working
informally, who derived more tangible benets from becoming documented and in many
cases moving to the formal sector. We thus replicate our short-term analysis using this
particular group of immigrants. These results are reported in Table 5. We observe that
the estimated e¤ect on food, clothing and other basic needs turns to be insignicant for
immigrants who were legal already before the enlargement. On the other hand, there is an
increase in their total consumption expenditure driven mainly by the increase in household
consumption of durable goods such as transportation, installment purchases and debt.
Table 6 focuses on the treatment e¤ect on labor market outcomes in the short-run for this
subgroup of formerly legal immigrants in order to explore the underlying mechanism behind
the response in consumption. The small and insignicant estimates on labor income (column
1) and on the probability of having a permanent contract (column 2) suggest that the labor
market outcomes of immigrants from newly accessed countries, who had a valid permit and
were working in the formal sector even before 2007, were not immediately a¤ected by the
EU enlargement. This is not surprising since transitions into permanent contracts usually
take time. Given that the ISMU data do not allow us to explore the long-term e¤ects of the
EU enlargement on the labor market outcomes of this subgroup of immigrants, we provide
further evidence using data from the Italian Social Security (INPS) records. The Social
Security data contain information for a 6,5% random sample of all private sector employees
in Italy (see Data Section in the Appendix for further details). Due to their administrative
nature, these data include only immigrants that are working in the formal labor market as
employees who in principle correspond to the ISMU subsample of documented immigrants
33As discussed in Section 2, work permits in Italy expire after one or two years, depending on the type of
contract (temporary/permanent). Therefore, we can identify immigrants that were documented and working
formally before the enlargement only in the short run.
34Although there is no retrospective information on informal/formal work, we assume that immigrants
who hold a residence permit for dependent work were working in the formal sector since this is the only way
to obtain the permit. Indeed, among the documented immigrants in our sample in 2006, 97% of those who
were holding a residence permit for dependent work were actually working in the formal sector.
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with a valid work permit.35 ;36 To have comparable results with the ISMU data, we restrict
the sample to immigrants that work in a rm located in Lombardy and appear at least once
in the Social Security data before 2007 with less than 10 years of experience.37 An advantage
of the Social Security data is that we can also observe daily wages, which di¤erently from
monthly wages in the ISMU data, do not reect changes in the labor supply. Appendix Table
A3 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample. We see that the treated and the control
groups experience similar increases in daily and monthly wages after the EU enlargement.
However, there is an increase in the percentage of workers with a permanent contract only
among the treated.
The panel nature of the administrative data allows us to follow individuals over time
and to perform a regression analysis with worker and rm xed e¤ects.38 In this way we
are able to account for unobserved heterogeneity without the extensive list of controls that
were available in the ISMU data and were important to include in a repeated cross-sectional
setting. Table 7 reports the results of this analysis. There is no statistically signicant
e¤ect on monthly (column 1) or daily (column 2) wages, while the probability of having a
permanent contract increases from 2008 onwards (column 3). Moreover, pre-trends seem
to be parallel as the coe¢ cients are not statistically signicant in the period before the
enlargement. The regression estimates conrm the cross sectional results from the ISMU
survey (Table 4, columns 5 and 6) and suggest that although legalization is not the reason
behind it, employers reacted positively to the fact that Romanians and Bulgarians did
not need to pass anymore through the tedious bureaucratic procedure of renewing their
work permit. In other words, the new legal framework after the EU accession acted as a
permanentwork permit. Increased employment stability reduced the uncertainty for future
labor income, which in turn increased their consumption expenditure. This result is in line
with Gathmann and Keller (2018) who nd that faster access to citizenship for immigrants
in Germany has improved their labor market attachment.
The above labor market story is broadly consistent with the pattern of our consumption
results. We observe an immediate increase in consumption in 2007 and then again a few years
later. The former is due to the increase in food, clothing and other basic need expenditures
35Hotchkiss et al. (2015) show that administrative data in the US may actually include a small number
of undocumented immigrants with fakescal code.
36As it is often common with administrative data, we are not able to distinguish unemployment from
non-participation in the Social Security Records.
37Since we lack information on the year of arrival in Italy, we use the date of entry in the labor market as
a proxy of the arrival date.
38We cluster standards errors at the worker and year level.
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by the previously undocumented immigrants whose labor income rises but also due to the
increase in durable goods by the previously documented immigrants working in the formal
sector. Although the latter did not experience any increase in labor income, they might
have anticipated that they would be able to access a permanent job in the future. Our
analysis supports this hypothesis as consumption increases again after having obtained the
permanent contract.
It is also worth noting that these results are suggestive of a reduced precautionary savings
motive. To verify this, we use the ISMU data that include some information on average
monthly savings in Italy as well as on average monthly remittances. Unlike consumption
expenditure, the information on remittances and savings in the ISMU data is imperfect
(Dustmann et al., 2017). Regarding savings, we only have information on savings held in
the host country but no information on savings held in the home country. Ideally, we would
like to have a measure of total savings (both in Italy and in the home country) in order to be
able to analyze precautionary savings.39 In relation to remittances, the ISMU survey asks
respondents to report the average amount they send home each month, which is subject
to measurement error, especially if transfers take alternative forms than sending money or
are less frequent. Moreover, remittances may either end up as savings or investment in
the home country or nance the consumption expenditures of family members who do not
live in Italy.40 This is why we study the two variables (savings in Italy and remittances)
both separately and jointly as a composite measure of total savings. As many immigrant
households in our sample report zero savings and/or remittances (42% and 47% of all cases,
respectively), we rst follow Dustmann and Mestres (2010b) and in our OLS estimates we
set zero savings and/or remittances to 1 and use log(y+1) as our dependent variable, where
y is savings, remittances or the sum of the two. Then, we adopt a linear probability model
in order to study the extensive margin of savings and remittances. Table 8 reports the
results of both models.41 There is a negative statistically signicant e¤ect on remittances
in 2010 and on savings in 2012. These are years for which we nd a positive e¤ect on
housing expenditures (Table 3, panel C) and a higher probability of having a permanent
employment contract (Table 7, column 3). In line with Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006),
39Dustmann and Mestres (2010a) show that not accounting for savings in the home country may result
in distorted conclusions regarding immigrantssaving behavior.
40 Immigrants may remit for a variety of reasons, ranging from altruism, exchange, inheritance, or strategic
motives to family insurance and investment motives (see, for an excellent review, Rapoport and Docquier,
2006).
41These results should be interpreted with caution for the reasons we described above regarding the
measurement of remittances and savings in the ISMU survey.
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who show that undocumented/risky-income immigrants tend to remit more, and Dustmann
and Mestres (2010a and 2010b), who show that temporary immigrants are likely to remit
and save more, we nd that immigrants, by getting legalized and accessing permanent
employment contracts, reduce savings and remittances after the EU enlargement.
7 Robustness Checks, Placebo Exercise and Alternative
Mechanisms
In this section we conduct various additional exercises. First, we address anticipation
and spillover e¤ects that are common threats to identication in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
framework. Second, we examine whether our estimates are sensitive to the measure of
consumption, to the denition of immigrant households or to the way of clustering, and
explore whether the business cycle or changes in household structure over time drive our
results. Third, we consider selective out-migration (composition e¤ects) and omitted vari-
ables/unobserved heterogeneity. Lastly, we perform a placebo exercise and discuss alterna-
tive mechanisms that may lie behind our ndings.
7.1 Robustness checks
We start by performing a series of exercises to examine the robustness of our benchmark
estimates (Table 3, panel A, column 4) and present these results in Table 9. First, we proceed
by looking at anticipation e¤ects as treated households that moved in Italy prior to the EU
enlargement may have somehow anticipated that the labor market restrictions would have
not been implemented. We thus restrict our sample to those that had migrated in Italy at
least one year, then two years and nally three years before December 27, 2007. Note that
the latter corresponds to immigrants who arrived in Italy even before the end of EU accession
negotiations of Bulgaria and Romania in 2004. These results are presented in columns 1-3.
We nd that both the short- and the medium-run e¤ects of the EU enlargement on the
total household consumption of the Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants remain positive
and signicant, even for those who arrived in Italy well before the announcement of the
policy, suggesting that our results are not driven by anticipation.
Second, we try to understand whether there are any spillover e¤ects between the treated
and the control group (the so-called SUTVA-see Rubin, 1977). In particular, if the treated
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and the control group competed for the same jobs, the EU accession could not only benet
the treated but also negatively a¤ect the control, undermining our di¤erence-in-di¤erence
strategy. To address this issue, we rst compare provinces where the treated and the control
group were of similar size before 2007 (Figure 3 panel a) to provinces where the treated group
was the minority (Figure 3 panel b).42 The idea behind our strategy is that spillover e¤ects
should be stronger in provinces where the treated and the control groups are of similar
sizes (potentially through the competition in the labor market) than in provinces where the
treatment group was a minority. The e¤ect of the EU enlargement on consumption is not
di¤erent between the two sets suggesting that SUTVA is likely to be satised in our setting.
A similar picture emerges when we compare occupations that experienced an increase in
the fraction of the treated group after the enlargement with industries/occupations that did
not (Figures 4a and 4b).43
We then check the sensitivity of our analysis to the alternative measures of consump-
tion. In particular, we use individual consumption calculated as the ratio between household
consumption and the number of members of the household residing in Italy, converted into
equalized adults using three alternative equivalence scales. These results are presented in
columns 4-6. In column 4 we use the standard OECD equivalence scale to calculate indi-
vidual consumption from household consumption, while in column 5 we utilize the modied
OECD scale and in column 6 the equivalence scale used by ISEE (Indicatore della situazione
economica equivalente).44 ;45 The estimated e¤ects are very similar across these di¤erent
measures of individual consumption and in line with our benchmark estimates presented in
Table 3 (panel A, column 4).
An additional robustness exercise is to use as an alternative control group the immi-
grants from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
42These provinces are in panel a, Province of Cremona, Province of Pavia, and Metropolitan City of Milan
and in panel b, Province of Varese, Province of Brescia, Province of Lecco, Province of Como, and Province
of Bergamo. See Appendix Table A4 for the relative sizes of the treatment and control groups by Italian
province of residence prior to the EU enlargement.
43See Appendix Table A5 for the percentage point change in the fraction of Romanian and Bulgarian
immigrants following the EU enlargement by occupation.
44Standard OECD equivalence scale assigns a weighting of 1 to the rst adult, 0.7 to the second and each
subsequent adult, and 0.5 to each child, whereas modied OECD equivalence scale assigns a weighting of
1 to the rst adult, 0.5 to the second and each subsequent adult, and 0.3 to each child in the household.
The equivalence scale used by ISEE, on the other hand, asssigns a weighting of 1 to the rst person in the
household, 0.57 to the second person, 0.47 to the third person, 0.42 to the fourth person, 0.39 to the fth
person, and 0.35 to the subsequent persons.
45 In these specications we do not control for the number of household members and the number of
cohabiting children as this is already taken into account by the equivalence scale. We still include though
controls for the total number of chidren and for whether the spouse of the respondent lives abroad in order
to account for non cohabiting household members.
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and Slovenia (together referred to as the A8 countries) that accessed the EU in 2004.46 The
advantage of using the nationals of A8 countries as a control group is that they are unlikely
to be a¤ected by the EU enlargement since they acquired the EU citizenship already in
2004. Thus, possible spillover e¤ects are not a concern in this setting. These results are
presented in Table 9, column 7. Comparison of these results to our benchmark estimates
in Table 3 shows that they are quite similar in magnitude, although the coe¢ cients are less
precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size.
Next, we check the sensitivity of our analysis to the denition of the immigrant house-
holdscountry of origin. Throughout our analysis, we consider a household being from a
particular country if the respondent is from that country. Although the ISMU data do
not include information on the nationality of each family member, there was a question
on whether the partner and the respondent came from the same country of origin (in case
the partner was listed among the cohabiting household members in Italy). This piece of
information is available in the survey years 2006-2012 but not in 2004-2005. As a robustness
check, we restrict our sample to immigrants who either do not live with a partner in Italy
or live with a partner from the same country of origin. Estimating our benchmark model
for this subgroup of immigrants does not alter our results in any way (column 8).
As discussed in Section 4, consumption expenditure might be correlated within the
country of origin groups, but also within provinces as immigrants from the same nationality
tend to concentrate/live close to each other. Thus, throughout our analysis, we use two-
way clustered (at Italian province of residence and at country of origin level), but we also
check how robust our estimates are to di¤erent ways of clustering. In particular, we cluster
standard errors only at the country of origin level (11 clusters) and use the wild bootstrap
method proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) with 1000 replications to account for the small
number of clusters. These results (column 9) are in line with the benchmark.
During the period of our analysis Italy experienced the Great Recession, which led to
severe job losses. Immigrants were particularly a¤ected as they tend to be more susceptible
to the economic cycle than natives (Dustmann et al., 2010). Although in our analysis both
the treated and the control group comprise of immigrants and are therefore exposed to
the recession in a similar way, it may be the case that the two groups were concentrated
in provinces or occupations that were di¤erently a¤ected by the recession. Therefore, we
46 In 2004, two other states, Cyprus and Malta also joined the EU. However, we do not observe anyone from
these two member states in our sample probably because these are countries with quite small population.
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add to our specication province-year, and occupation-year xed e¤ects in order to explore
whether our results are driven by the business cycle at the local and occupational level.47
To do so, we restrict the sample to employed individuals and use available information on
the occupation of the immigrant (e.g. domestic worker, artisan, intellectual, employee in
hotels/restaurants, construction worker, salesperson -see Appendix Table A5). The results
after the inclusion of these new set of dummies (column 10) are similar to the benchmark.
Moreover, given that the EU enlargement may have a¤ected the fertility or family re-
unication decisions of the immigrants, we include in our specication, in addition to the
controls for the presence of a spouse living with the respondent in Italy and for the total
number of children, their interaction with year dummies so as to invistigate whether changes
in the household structure over time drive the results on consumption (column 11). The
estimates of this further robustness check show that our results are not sensitive to the
changes in the household structure over time.
Another possible threat to our identication strategy is selective out-migration. It is
possible that the composition of our sample changes after the EU accession given that the
treated group acquired the right to move freely to other countries within the EU or due
to return migration. In particular, mobility may be non-random and treated households
that did not prosper in Italy may decide to leave the country in search of better opportu-
nities elsewhere in the EU. If the composition of immigrants changed in some systematic
way following the EU enlargement, then we need to take account of this selection when
assessing the e¤ects of EU enlargement on household consumption expenditure. For this
purpose, we estimate a version of equation (2), where the dependent variable is the immi-
grantscharacteristics (female, young, low educated, number of household members). These
results are presented in Appendix Table A6. We do not nd any signicant change in the
composition of our sample following the EU enlargement, conrming the robustness of our
results. Moreover, the ISMU data include direct information on the intentions of immigrants
to leave Italy (to return to the home country or move to a di¤erent country). This infor-
mation is available only in the period 2010-2012, so we cannot study the e¤ect of the EU
enlargement. Still, we can check whether the intentions to leave Italy were systematically
di¤erent between the treated and the control group in the period 2010-2012. Results in
Appendix Table A7 show that Romanians and Bulgarians are not more likely to select into
47 Including these controls in our main specication reduces our sample size as the occupation variable is
only available for employed individuals.
24
return migration/migration towards a di¤erent country than immigrants from EU candidate
countries. This is true also when we restrict the sample to immigrants who arrived in Italy
one or two years before the enlargement (columns 2 and 3).
Although in our analysis we include a comprehensive set of individual and household
variables, a possible concern is that they may not fully control for all the relevant character-
istics and thus equation (2) could su¤er from the omitted variables problem. To assess the
inuence of omitted variables relative to the one of observed characteristics, we use a method
proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and calculate the ratio of the inuence of unobserved char-
acteristics relative to the one of observed control variables that would be required so as to
fully explain away our result. The intuition behind this approach is that if the inclusion of
observed control variables substantially weakens the impact of the EU enlargement, then
one would expect that the inclusion of additional controls (observed or unobserved) would
reduce the estimated e¤ect even further. Conversely, if the inclusion of additional controls
has no substantial e¤ect on the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimate, then this will support
the causal interpretation. Thus, a large ratio would imply that the unobserved heterogeneity
cannot fully explain away the estimated e¤ect of the EU enlargement. In Appendix Table
A8, we present this ratio based on our main results on total consumption (Table 3). The
reported ratios are between three and seven, suggesting that in order to attribute the entire
estimated e¤ect of the EU enlargement on the total consumption to selection e¤ects, the
inuence of unobservable factors would have to be between three to seven times greater
than the one of the observable characteristics. These values are considered to be high (see,
for example, Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Guriev et al., 2019; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).
Therefore, we conclude that our estimates cannot be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity.
7.2 Placebo exercise and alternative mechanisms
We have seen so far that the EU accession increased the household consumption of
the treated with respect to the control and provided evidence that the improved labor
market conditions is a possible underlying mechanism. To provide additional supporting
evidence, we perform a placebo exercise on a group of immigrants who were unlikely to
benet from the EU accession and were excluded from our analysis so far. In particular,
we focus on immigrants who either held the Italian citizenship or were eligible to apply
for it by 2007 (having resided in Italy for more than 10 years). We compare this group of
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immigrants with immigrants in the sample we used for our benchmark estimates, that we
further split between those with less than 5 years and those with 5-10 years of residence by
2007. The latter were eligible for permanent residence permits and therefore the expected
benets from the EU accession would be lower for them. Table 10 reports the results for
these three separate groups.48 We verify a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect among
immigrants with less than 5 years of residence by 2007 (column 1), while the coe¢ cient of
the interaction term is still positive but half in size and not statistically di¤erent from zero
among immigrants with 5-10 years of residence (column 2). The e¤ect completely vanishes
(and turns even negative) when we focus instead on immigrants who held or were eligible
to apply for the Italian citizenship by 2007 (column 3). This placebo exercise is consistent
with the notion that immigrants who benetted from the EU accession most were those not
close to acquiring permanent residence or citizenship rights in Italy.
Still, the labor market mechanism does not exclude other channels that may have also
contributed. More specically, the EU accession may have also facilitated the access to
credit for the treated households although in our benchmark specication we do not nd
any evidence of increased expenditures regarding housing, at least in the short run (Table
2, panel C). A possible reason is that mortgage payments and rent enter in the same way
in the expenditures for housing. As the ISMU data do not contain any information on
mortgages, we utilize a di¤erent data source, the Survey on Income and Life Conditions
of Households with Foreigners conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics in
2009. The survey has been conducted only once and followed closely the design of the
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) but with a sample
exclusively composed of households with at least one foreigner. Moreover, it has been
specically designed to be representative by nationality (see Data Section in the Appendix).
More importantly, the survey contains unique information on whether households have a
mortgage and the year that they obtained it. We dene the treated and the control group
in the same way as in the benchmark exercise and apply the same sample restrictions and
identication strategy but we see no clear di¤erence in the fraction of the treated and control
with a mortgage issued immediately before or after the EU enlargement (see Appendix Table
A9).49
48Due to the sample split, we report the e¤ect for the entire post period (2007-2012) as the number of
observations is too small to perform a year-by-year analysis.
49More precisely, there is an increase in the fraction of immigrants with a mortgage issued after the EU
enlargement but this is true both for the treatment and the control group.
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Another possible mechanism is access to social benets such as welfare or unemployment
benets. This mechanism could be relevant only for previously undocumented immigrants
since documented immigrants, as long as they satisfy the eligibility conditions in terms of
income thresholds and previous work experience, have access to social benets even before
the enlargement. However, in the period of our analysis (2004-2012), the measures to
alleviate poverty were quite limited in Italy (i.e. a social card for food purchases of up to 40
euros per month for poor families with children less than 3 years old or for the elderly-see
Madana et al., 2014). Moreover, Italy was among the countries with the lowest replacement
rate in unemployment (OECD, 2009) and benets were accessible only by workers with at
least 2 years of social insurance seniority (Giorgi, 2018). Therefore, we expect that social
benets have a played a rather limited role.
At this point it is also worth noting that there is a literature that emphasizes the e¤ects
of immigration on prices (see, for example, Lach, 2007 for Israeli cities; Cortes, 2008 for the
US cities; Zachariadis, 2011 and 2012 for a study of 140 cities in 90 countries). Although
the proposed underlying mechanisms di¤er, the empirical studies commonly agree that an
increase in immigration reduces prices.50 In relation to our ndings, if all prices went down
due to the EU enlargement, this would a¤ect both the treated and the control group, and
hence this would not a¤ect our results. If we assume that only prices related to certain
Romanian and Bulgarian products went down and that the demand for these products
is generally higher among the treated, the e¤ect on total consumption expenditure would
depend on the elasticity of these products and on their relative weight in the consumer
basket. Although we cannot exclude this mechanism, we do not expect it to be the main
driver of our results given the range of Romanian and Bulgarian products available in Italy.
Therefore, the improved labor market conditions continues to be the most plausible
underlying mechanism behind the increases in the household consumption of the treated.
Moving out of the shadow economy for previously undocumented immigrants as well as
the increased probability of getting a permanent job for previously documented mmigrants,
whose work permit was no longer of limited duration, are the two main channels.
50For instance, according to Lach (2007) the underlying mechanisms is a demand-side channel of increased
search and higher price elasticities for immigrants, while Cortes (2008) provides a supply-side explanation
(through a reduction in wages).
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8 Conclusions
In this paper we focus on Romanian and Bulgarian households that had migrated to
Italy before 2007 and study whether the accession of their home country in 2007 a¤ected
their consumption behavior. We nd that their average monthly consumption expenditure
increased signicantly as soon as their home country accessed the EU. This increase is not
just temporary and it cannot be attributed to the mere legalization.
On the one hand, immigrants from the new member countries who were working in-
formally in Italy before the EU accession experience increases in labor income after the
accession by moving away from the shadow economy. On the other hand, documented
immigrants from the new member countries who were working formally in Italy even be-
fore accessing the EU do not experience wage increases but have an increased probability
of getting a permanent contract after the accession. We conjecture that the resolution of
uncertainty regarding the renewal of work permits has contributed to this e¤ect. In the
new legal framework work permits did not have to be renewed for the citizens of the new
member countries making rms more willing to o¤er them permanent contracts. Enhanced
labor market stability decreases the uncertainty regarding future labor income and it con-
sequently increases household expenditures-particularly those on durables. Our results are
robust to a series of robustness checks addressing anticipation and composition e¤ects as
well as spillovers. We also discuss alternative possible channels, such as improved access
to credit, and we conclude that improved labor market conditions is the most plausible
underlying mechanism.
Our results have important policy implications in a period of increased legal uncertainty,
following the decision of the United Kingdom to exit the EU, which is expected to increase
signicantly the bureaucratic burden of acquiring work permits. Moreover, our ndings of a
positive e¤ect of immigrantslegalization on consumption expenditures in the host country
contribute to the recent debate over the refugee crisis in Europe and the construction of the
wall in the borders of the US with Mexico.
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Figure 1. Immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries residing in Italy,
average monthly consumption expenditure
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) 2004-2012 surveys. Sample includes immigrants from
Romania, Bulgaria and candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) who arrived in Italy before 2007, who do not hold Italian citizenship by the
time of the interview and with no more than ten years of residence in Italy by the time of the EU accession.
The red vertical line represents the date of the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria (1 January 2007). See
text for variable denitions.
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Figure 2. Estimated e¤ect of the EU enlargement on the log monthly consumption expenditure of
immigrant households from new EU member countries before, during, and after the EU accession
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) 2004-2012 surveys. Sample includes immigrants from
Romania, Bulgaria and candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) who arrived in Italy before 2007, who do not hold Italian citizenship by the
time of the interview, with no more than ten years of residence in Italy by the time of the EU accession and
with non-missing information on all variables included in equation (2). Each black dot displays the coe¢ cient
estimate of the interaction term between new EU indicator and the corresponding year from the full specica-
tion The 95% condence interval is constructed using the two way clustered (at Italian province of residence
and at country of origin level) standard errors. The red vertical line represents the date of the EU accession
of Romania and Bulgaria (1 January 2007).
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a. Provinces where the treatment and the control groups were of similar size before 2007
b. Provinces where the treatment group was the minority before 2007
Figure 3. Immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries residing in Italy,
average monthly consumption expenditure by Italian province of residence
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) 2004-2012 surveys. Provinces included in panel a are
Province of Cremona, Province of Pavia, and Metropolitan City of Milan. Provinces included in panel b are
Province of Varese, Province of Brescia, Province of Lecco, Province of Como, and Province of Bergamo. The
red vertical line represents the date of the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria (1 January 2007). See Data
Appendix for the full set of sample restrictions and variable denitions.
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a. Occupations that experienced an increase in the fraction of treated after 2007
b. Occupations that did not experience an increase in the fraction of treated after 2007
Figure 4. Immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries residing in Italy,
average monthly consumption expenditure by occupation
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) 2004-2012 surveys. The red vertical line
represents the date of the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria (1 January 2007). See Data
Appendix for the full set of sample restrictions, variable denitions, and grouping of occupations.
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Table 6. Estimated e¤ect of EU enlargement on the labor market outcomes of
immigrant households from new EU member countries (2006-2007), immigrants
who were documented and working formally before accession
Labor income Permanent contract
(in log)
(1) (2)
post 0.005 -0.096
(0.027) (0.024)
new EU x post 0.022 0.039
(0.038) (0.061)
Country of origin dum. Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes
Nobs 801 801
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.113
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) surveys 2006 and 2007. *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Two-way clustered standard errors (at Italian province of residence
and at country of origin level) are in parentheses (88 clusters). All specications include a
constant term, country of origin and Italian province of residence xed e¤ects. Individual
controls include respondents sex, age, age squared, dummies for education level (none, pri-
mary, secondary, tertiary), and years of residence in Italy. Sample is restricted to documen-
ted immigrants who reported in 2007 to have a valid residence permit for (dependent) work.
See Data Appendix for the remaining set of sample restrictions and variable denitions.
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Table 7. Estimated e¤ect of EU enlargement on the labor market outcomes of
immigrant households from new EU member countries (2001-2012), immigrants
who were working formally before accession
Monthly wage Daily wage Permanent
(in log) (in log) contract
(1) (2) (3)
new EU x year 2002 -0.003 -0.001 0.020
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
new EU x year 2003 0.010 0.000 0.015
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016)
new EU x year 2004 -0.001 -0.007 0.019
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017)
new EU x year 2005 0.013 0.011 0.022
(0.015) (0.012) (0.018)
new EU x year 2006 0.002 0.007 0.023
(0.016) (0.013) (0.019)
new EU x year 2007 -0.000 -0.000 0.032
(0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
new EU x year 2008 0.008 -0.004 0.041*
(0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
new EU x year 2009 0.009 0.003 0.038*
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020)
new EU x year 2010 0.001 -0.008 0.039*
(0.018) (0.014) (0.020)
new EU x year 2011 -0.003 -0.008 0.051**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.021)
new EU x year 2012 0.019 0.007 0.037
(0.019) (0.014) (0.021)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 38,081 38,081 38,081
Adjusted R2 0.603 0.681 0.697
Data source: Italian Social Security (INPS) records 2001-2012. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Standard errors clustered at the worker and year level are in parentheses. All specications in-
clude year, worker and rm xed e¤ects. Sample includes immigrants that work in a rm loca-
ted in Lombardy and appeared at least once in the social security records before 2007 with less
than 10 years of experience.
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Appendix
Data
ISMU data
Our main data source is an annual survey launched in 2001 by a non-governmental
organization, the Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) to study the foreign population
residing in the Lombardy region of Italy. Each survey takes place between May and mid
July and consists of a random sample of about 8,000 immigrants, who are aged 15 and over
and reside in Lombardy at the time of the interview. Its two-stage sampling scheme, the
Centre Sampling Method (Baio et al., 2011), was specically designed to collect information
on a representative sample of both documented and undocumented immigrants. At the rst
stage municipalities are selected according to their share of immigrants, their socio-economic
situation and their demographic representativeness at the regional level. At the second stage,
for each municipality a set of aggregation centersthat the target population frequently visit
(e.g. mosques, churches, language centers, etc.) are identied and immigrants are randomly
selected in each center. Interviewees then are asked to answer a set of questions through
a face-to-face interview by interviewers with a foreign background, who have undergone
specic training and emphasize the independence of ISMU from the government at the
beginning of the interview.
The statistical unit of analysis in the ISMU surveys is the individual and data include
detailed information on personal characteristics such as country of origin, whether the re-
spondent has a valid residence permit or not, type of residence permit, age, gender, educa-
tion, marital status, years of residence in Italy, as well as on labor market characteristics of
employed respondents such as type of employment (self-employed/employee), occupation,
and sector (informal/formal) of employment, labor income, as well as some information
on the household characteristics (e.g. average monthly household expenditure, household
size, number of children, whether the spouse lives with the respondent, whether the type of
accommodation is own property).
We restrict our sample to immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria (treatment group)
and from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Ser-
bia, and Turkey (control group) who arrived in Italy before 2007, who do not hold Italian
citizenship by the time of the interview and with no more than ten years of residence in
52
Italy by the time of the EU accession. In our main analysis we use data from the 2004-2012
surveys as information on household consumption expenditure is available only after 2004,
whereas information on labor market outcomes is available also in 2001-2003. Thus, our
labor market analysis utilizes the 2001-2012 survey data.
Table A1 displays the average characteristics of the immigrants in the ISMU survey and
in the o¢ cial registry of immigrants residing in Lombardy in 2006 provided by the Italian
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).51 The comparison of columns 1 and 2 conrms
that the ISMU survey is representative of the immigrant population in Lombardy in terms
of nationality and gender.
Italian Social Security (INPS) records
The source for the data consists of social security payments made by legal entities
to the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS) for all employees with open-ended
(permanent), xed-term (temporary) and apprenticeship contracts. From this master data,
INPS extracts two datasets which can be linked to each other. The rst consists of the
universe of rms with at least one employee at some point during a given calendar year and
provides data at the establishment level. The second consists of the employment histories of
all workers born on the rst or the ninth day of each month (24 dates). The worker extraction
provides information on demographics, annual gross wages, the number of months and days
worked, the type of employment contract (permanent or temporary) and whether the job
is full time or part time. We construct daily (monthly) wages by dividing annual gross
wages with the number of days (months) worked and we express the wages of part-time
workers in full-time equivalent units. In our analysis, we restrict the sample to immigrants
from Romania and Bulgaria (treatment group) and from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey (control group) that work in
a rm located in Lombardy and appear at least once in the Social Security records before
2007 with less than 10 years of experience. In this way, we ensure the comparability of
the results with the estimates obtained using the ISMU survey. Furthermore, we consider
workers aged between 20 and 64 that have worked for at least 15 days each year52 so as to
have a well-dened measure of wage even for immigrant workers with weak labor market
attachments and to exclude possible students or retirees.
51We report these statistics for 2006, which is the year before the EU enlargement.
52We get very similar results if we increase the threshold to 20 or 30 days worked per year.
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Survey on Income and Life Conditions of Households with Foreigners
As the ISMU data do not contain any information on mortgages, we complement our
analysis using data from the Survey on Income and Life Conditions of Households with
Foreigners, which is the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) Italian Module on Foreign Population that was collected by the Italian Institute of
Statistics (ISTAT) in 2009. The survey has been conducted only once and followed closely
the design of the EU-SILC but with a sample exclusively composed of households with at
least one foreigner (who is residing in Italy and do not have Italian citizenship). The sample
includes 6,014 families and 15,036 individuals (9,243 of at least 15 years old at the end
of the income reference period) were surveyed in all the Italian regions. The content of
the questionnaire followed closely that of the EU-SILC 2009 survey, with some additional
questions particularly relevant for the foreign population. The survey contains information
on whether households have a mortgage, and if they do, information on the year that they
obtained it (see, for more information, https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/52405).
In our analysis, we consider only household heads and restrict our sample to immigrants
from Romania and Bulgaria (treatment group) and from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey (control group) who arrived
in Italy before 2007, who do not hold Italian citizenship by the time of the interview and
with no more than ten years of residence in Italy by the time of the EU accession.
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Table A1. Representativeness of the ISMU survey
ISMU ISTAT
(1) (2)
By gender (%)
Males 52.5 58.6
By nationality (%)
Treated
Romania 7.7 5.8
Bulgaria 0.8 0.6
Control
Albania 10.5 9.0
Serbia and Montenegro 1.3 1.2
Moldova 1.1 2.0
Macedonia 1.0 0.5
Turkey 0.7 0.8
Bosnia-Erzegovina 0.6 0.5
Croatia 0.4 0.5
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) survey 2006
and o¢ cial registry data (http://demo.istat.it/archivio.html).
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Table A2. ISMU data, variable denitions
Variable Type Denition
Individual characteristics
Country of origin categorical Country of origin of the respondent
Gender binary
8><>: 0 if the respondent is a male1 if the respondent is a female
Age continuous in years (15+)
Education categorical
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 None
2 Primary/Compulsory education
3 Secondary education
4 Tertiary education or above
Years of residence continuous years of residence in Italy
Documented binary
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if the respondent has no valid residence permit
1 if the respondent reported to have a valid residence permit
or currently renewing the temporary residence permit, or
is an applicant for legalization
Household characteristics
Number of household members continuous
Total number of family members living with the respondent
in Italy that the reported household consumption expenditures
correspond to
Children binary
8><>: 0 if number of children is zero1 if number of children is positive
Number of children continuous Total number of children (living in Italy or abroad)
N. of cohabiting children continuous Number of children living with the respondent
N. of cohabiting non-adult children continuous Number of children younger than 18, living with the respondent
Spouse living abroad binary
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if the respondent is single or is married and the spouse
is listed among the household members in Italy
1 if the respondent is married but the spouse is not listed
among the household members in Italy
Living in own property binary
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if type of accommodation the respondent is
living in is not own property
1 if type of accommodation the respondent is
living in is own property56
Table A2 (cont.). ISMU data, variable denitions
Variable Type Denition
Labor market characteristics
Labor income continuous net of taxes, Euros per month (0 if not employed)
In the labor force binary
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if the respondent reported to be a
student/homemaker/retired
1 if the respondent reported to be
unemployed/an employee/self-employed)
Employed binary
8><>: 0 if the respondent is unemployed/student/homemaker/retired1 if the respondent is an employee/self-employed
Employee binary
8><>: 0 if the respondent is self-employed1 if the respondent is an employee
Formal sector binary
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if the respondent is an employee and reported to work
in the formal sector
1 if the respondent is an employee and reported to work
in the informal sector
Permanent contract binary
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if the respondent is an employee and reported to work
under a temporary contract
1 if the respondent is an employee and reported to work
under a permanent contract
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Table A4. Relative size of treatment and control groups before 2007 by
Italian province of residence
Italian province of Before the EU enlargement Number of
residence % treated % control observations
Province of Cremona 49.54 50.46 343
Metropolitan City of Milan 47.94 52.06 247
Province of Pavia 45.60 54.40 125
Province of Sondrio 43.20 56.80 922
Province of Mantua 41.67 58.33 300
Province of Lodi 41.58 58.42 383
Province of Varese 35.57 64.43 318
Province of Brescia 33.16 66.84 216
Province of Lecco 24.55 75.45 168
Province of Como 21.86 78.14 110
Province of Bergamo 21.00 79.00 202
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) surveys 2004-2006. The sample in-
cludes immigrants who arrived in Italy before 2007, with no more than ten years of resi-
dence in Italy by 2007, who did not hold Italian citizenship by the time of the interview.
Treated: Nationals of Romania and Bulgaria. Control: Nationals of Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.
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Table A5. Fraction of treatment group by occupation, before and after the EU enlargement
Occupation % treated p.p. change in the
Before 2007 After 2007 fraction of treated
White collar employees 26.32 45.16 18.85
Domestic workers (occasional) 41.46 51.64 10.17
Transport workers 36.99 46.39 9.40
Doctors and paramedics 40.00 49.18 9.18
Artisans 29.94 38.89 8.95
Cleanining workers 37.11 45.45 8.34
Prostitutes 41.67 50.00 8.33
Social eld assistants 47.37 53.13 5.76
Workers in the tertiary sector 37.80 41.14 3.34
Secretaries 36.36 37.50 1.14
Intellectual workers 41.46 42.22 0.76
Construction workers 31.15 31.06 -0.08
Home assistants 77.51 77.40 -0.11
Catering/hotel workers 4015 39.88 -0.26
Other occupations 53.57 53.16 -0.41
Skilled workers 33.02 30.43 -2.58
Workers in the secondary sector 40.00 35.83 -4.17
Workers in the primary sector 44.12 37.50 -6.62
Baby sitters 61.90 55.00 -6.90
Sales and service employees 43.55 33.11 -10.44
Domestic workers (full/part time) 65.22 52.56 -12.65
Commerce 50.00 27.42 -22.58
Switchboard operators 75.00 31.25 -43.75
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) surveys 2004-2012. The sample includes immigrants
who arrived in Italy before 2007, with no more than ten years of residence in Italy by 2007, who did not hold
Italian citizenship by the time of the interview. Treated: Nationals of Romania and Bulgaria. Control: Natio-
nals of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.
p.p.: percentage points.
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Table A6. Testing the validity of the research design: The e¤ects of the EU enlargement
on the composition of the treated and the control group
% female % youth % low educated Average number of
(<30 years old) (primary or none) household members
new EU x post 0.031 -0.024 0.039 0.076
(0.029) (0.021) (0.032) (0.092)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 5,385 5,385 5,385 5,385
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.034 0.081 0.103
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) surveys 2004-2012. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Two-way clustered standard errors (at Italian province of residence and at country of origin level) are in
parentheses (121 clusters). All specications include a constant term, year, country of origin and Italian
province of residence xed e¤ects. See Data Appendix for variable denitions and sample restrictions.
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Table A7. Di¤erences in the intentions to leave Italy between immigrants from new EU
and candidate countries (2010-2012)
Linear probability model Intention to leave Italy Intention to leave Italy Intention to leave Italy
pre 2007 arrivals pre 2006 arrivals pre 2005 arrivals
(1) (2) (3)
new EU 0.009 0.011 0.010
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Nobs 1,246 1,123 941
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.046 0.053
Data source: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) surveys 2010-2012. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Two-way clustered standard errors (at Italian province of residence and at country of origin level) are in
parentheses (121 clusters). All specications include year and Italian province of residence xed e¤ects, and
a constant term. Individual controls include respondents gender, age, age squared, dummies for education
level (none, primary, secondary, tertiary), and years of residence in Italy. Household controls include an in-
dicator for having a spouse living abroad, number of household members, number of children, number of co-
habiting children, and number of cohabiting non adult children. See Data Appendix for variable denitions
and sample restrictions.
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Table A8. Using selection on observables to assess the bias from unobservables
Restricted model Full model Total consumption
Table 3 Column 1 vs Table 3 Column 4 7.13
Table 3 Column 2 vs Table 3 Column 4 3.19
Table 3 Column 3 vs Table 3 Column 4 3.72
Notes: Each cell of the table reports the ratio based on the coe¢ cient estimate of the inter-
action between new EU and year 2007 from the corresponding restricted model (estimate of
R0 in equation 2, bR0 ) and the full model (estimate of F0 in equation 2, bF0 ). The reported
ratio is calculated as: bF0 =(bR0   bF0 ). See Table 3 for the description of the full set of con-
trols included in each specication.
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Table A9. Fraction of treatment and control groups with
mortgage issued before and after the EU enlargement
Treated Control
% with a mortgage 5.06 4.95
% with a mortgage by year of issue
2006 1.41 1.93
2007-2008 3.65 3.02
Total number of observations 830 469
Data source: Survey on Income and Life Conditions of Households with
Foreigners 2009. The table presents weighted results (using EU-SILC Per-
sonal cross-sectional weights). The sample is restricted to household heads
and includes immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria (treated) and from
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montene-
gro, Serbia, and Turkey (control) who arrived in Italy before 2007, who do
not hold Italian citizenship by the time of the interview and with no more
than ten years of residence in Italy by the time of the EU accession.
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a. Lombardy in Italy/Europe
b. Provinces of Lombardy
Figure A2. Lombardy region of Italy
Source: IReR (2010), The region of Lombardy, Italy: Self-Evaluation Report, OECD Reviews of Higher
Education in Regional and City Development, IMHE.
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